End of the ‘Liberation War
Narrative’?
By Terence Chitapi
Introduction
The quest for a post-colonial
developmental state in Zimbabwe which started in 1980 has delivered mixed
results for the country and its citizens. From the early successes in basic social
service delivery to the chaotic but necessary land reform exercise, all the
positives have been blighted by the general malaise that has bedeviled the
country since the late 1990s. This has been the result of cumulative knocks on
the economy from the effects of mismanagement, corruption and the disastrous
effects of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) of the Bretton
Woods institutions. The contestation for state power coupled with the right to
govern and steer development has been dominated by Zanu PF since independence
in 1980.
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| Zanu PF has continuously used the liberation war as a claim to power. |
Zanu PF has won elections on the
strength of this liberation war narrative
– that it is only those that participated in the liberation struggle as
fighters that have an entitlement to govern (rule as they say) Zimbabwe. The narrative
has been used as the sole cross-cutting credential in deciding who ascends to
state power in Zimbabwe. This argument has been practically cemented through
the systematic deployment of former liberation fighters in various arms of
government, and not less in the civil service. However, events on the ground
with regards the former liberation movement Zanu PF point to a changing of narrative,
this in terms of challenging the liberation
war narrative that has sustained the party politically to this day. And
this new narrative seeks apparently to ride on the new realities of the post-colonial
state in Africa where the youth are the emerging dominant demographic majority.
From
a socialist state to state capitalism
 |
| ESAP delivered a big blow to the young welfare state. |
Zanu PF emerged victorious at the
1980 polls on the back of promises towards building a socialist welfare state
based on a redistributive agenda. This was meant to correct the skewed
allocation and ownership of the primary resource for production - land – and
the adjoining linkages of opportunities driving a modern developmental economy.
However, like most post-colonial African states, the Zimbabwean government
failed to guard against the intrusion of the Bretton Woods institutions.
Zimbabwe was to eventually capitulate to the Economic Structural Adjustment Programmes
(ESAP) prescribed by the IMF and World Bank as the panacea to laying a
neo-liberal foundation in building the modern developmental state. This, coupled
with corruption and neo-patrimonial tendencies led to an inevitable deterioration
of the economy. The Willowgate scandal of 1989 was just but the protruding tip
of the corruption iceberg that continues to deter meaningful economic
development in the country.
| The land reform though necesssary, has been used by Zanu PF as a political tool. |
The inability of the ruling
government post-2000 to satisfy the needs of its citizens in the face of dismal
economic performance and shrinking fiscal space has meant decreased popularity
and a matching increase in voices of dissent. This did coincide with the
emergence of the MDC as a formidable opposition to the Zanu PF hegemony. All
this while, the liberation war narrative
remained a dominant theme as Zanu PF launched the 3rd Chimurenga, a
necessary but populist redistribution of land to protect its self-imposed
entitlement to state power. Zanu PF has however over that time metamorphosed
from a government holding onto power by means most foul to more subtle and
covert means of coercion. Patronage and clientelism top this list. In an environment
where formal businesses are struggling, the government continues to use the
allocation of state tenders to entrench its patronage network. The
neopatrimonial scourge has also ensured that the state-owned enterprises and
parastatals that seemingly survived privatization during ESAP have been
virtually run-down amidst state-sanctioned plunder and mismanagement.
The
change mantra becomes an illusion
Since the MDC was the first party
to really threaten the hegemonic status of Zanu PF, it is no wonder that it has
continued to carry the hopes of those that see no future in Zanu PF’s ability
to steer the country on a genuinely developmental path. The ‘change mantra’ did
resonate with a significant majority of citizens. On March 29 2008 the biggest
verdict against the economic plunder and underdevelopment was passed by the
citizens and Zanu PF lost its parliamentary majority for the first time. Its presidential
candidate Robert Mugabe came second best in the first round of polls, scoring
43% against Morgan Tsvangirai’s 47%.
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| Service chiefs... subverting the constitution in the name of Zanu PF |
It was in the aftermath of this
poll that the nation was practically made to endure the reality of what the ‘liberation war narrative as a claim to
state power’ was in reality. In 2002, the late Zimbabwe National Army
commander Vitalis Zvinavashe in the company of other service chiefs had blatantly
warned, “Let it be known that the highest office in the land is a straight
jacket whose occupant is expected to observe the objectives of the liberation
struggle. We will therefore not accept, let alone support or salute anyone with
a different agenda that threatens the very existence of our sovereignty, our country
and our people.” While in 2002 Mugabe won, in 2008 he was defeated and true to
their word, the military led a reversal of that first round win by Morgan
Tsvangirai. The liberation war narrative
was their guiding narrative.
Sadly, the inadequateness of a
clear winner in the March 2008 elections necessitated the promulgation of a
negotiated government, commonly referred to as the government of national unity
(GNU). While others have argued to the contrary, many believe that the period
during which the main opposition parties had a flirtation with state power in
the GNU overall worked to diminish the people’s confidence in the ‘change
mantra’ as a panacea to arresting the Zanu PF-inspired collapse.
Decimating
the liberation war narrative
| Professor Moyo argues that G40 is not a faction but a demographic issue. |
The events in Zanu PF, in
particular the factional wars over succession are telling when looked at from
the perspective of a singular narrative playing a major part in deciding our
national politics. What is clear since that party’s last congress in 2014 is
how the claim to power on the basis of the liberation
war narrative is slowly but surely being decimated. Professor Jonathan
Moyo, widely seen as a leading figure in what is commonly referred to as the G40
faction argues that the moniker G40 is not a faction, but rather “a purely
demographic issue that seeks to describe the generation from where the
political future of the country is expected to derive shape.”
The faction said to be led by former
Vice President Emmerson Mnangagwa using the moniker Team Lacoste has made clear
their views and intentions viz succession. They want Mnangagwa to succeed
Mugabe and their choice’s entitlement to govern is based on the liberation war narrative. On the other
hand, the faction referred to as G40 is firmly focused on outdoing and undoing the
liberation war narrative, instead
pointing to the inescapable narrative of generational succession, based on the
simple reality of succession by or through age or the passage of time. The
roping in of Sydney Sekeramayi by G40 into the succession rate is an indirect
admission to the relevance of the liberation
war narrative to succession politics. That the G40 faction is itself
fronted by younger politicians who took no part, at least directly, in the war of
liberation is itself telling of the project to dismantle the liberation war narrative.
For those that have pursued the liberation war narrative as their sole
claim to political power and legitimacy, a lot of naivety has also been exposed
of their thinking. If the truth be told without fear or favour, it was always
really unwise of the war veterans who found themselves enjoying state power to
invoke the liberation war narrative
each time they faced constitutional challenges to their political power. The
2002 press conference by Zvinavashe and his ilk was a nauseating and sad
chapter in the history of electoral politics in Zimbabwe. The very same ideal
to self-determination of a people that necessitated the liberation struggle is
what this liberation war narrative
attacked.
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| The liberation war remains all-important as it birthed Zimbabwe. |
This is not to say that the
citizens do not acknowledge and respect the liberation war, its ideals and what
it brought for the country. To the contrary, the citizens are really frustrated
with how erstwhile liberators have turned out to be worse oppressors and
plunderers than the preceding white colonial minority. For the record, the
liberation struggle was against the very virtues that seem to drive Zanu PF as
a party and political system currently. After all, so many lost life and limb
in that struggle, and these were not just Zanu cadres; in fact more civilians
lost their lives than Zanu cadres in the trenches. Those are realities of open
armed conflict. And to want to monopolize such a collective narrative as a
claim to political power for a rogue few, is the height of hypocrisy, it does
not come any worse.
Passing
on the baton only way on both sides
| 2018 main battle will be between the MDC and Zanu PF. |
As we face another plebiscite in
2018, it is worth pointing out a few issues. As with previous elections since
2000, we again will witness a binary contest between the MDC and Zanu PF. Never
mind the coalition dynamics, they are really inconsequential to that binary
contest. Yes, some may argue that coalition dynamics will influence numbers and
have already written on that.
Heading to 2018, Zanu PF despite
holding the advantage of incumbency has to grapple with factionalism over
succession and as well battling the electoral verdict of an imploding economy. For
President Mugabe and his G40 faction, his battles will include retaining (a
semblance of what remains of) the liberation
war narrative. Whatever remains of his tattered revolutionary legacy borrows
a lot from the liberation war narrative.
He also has to acknowledge the new reality of the youth demographic dominance,
with no liberation war credentials. Hence you have the youth interface rallies
and the revisionist narrations and counter-narrations of the liberation war
history. Besides the fight over the liberation
war narrative, the fight is as well very much about passing on the baton to
a ‘younger’ leader.
On the other side, the MDC-T (and
its potential allies in the opposition) will have to find common ground in
confronting Zanu PF electorally. This is their best if not only chance to
victory. The MDC (even when considered with its ‘Alliance’ partners) seems also
very much faced with the same question of the old giving up space for the
young. Yes, the party might have succeeded in the past, like Zanu PF, to stifle
debate on issues of incumbency and succession at the top echelons of its
political structures but again it is a basic tenet in political organization
that can never be wished away. In the process, the opposition has unwittingly
become a carbon copy of, as it has mimicked the very same antics it has pointed
out Zanu PF for. Passing on the baton to a younger leader again remains the most viable option for Morgan Tsvangirai and the MDC-T/Alliance.
What is apparent is that even if
Zanu PF does retain the liberation war
narrative in its scheme of politics, the same narrative has had its potency
diluted by virtue of the acknowledgement of the importance of the present
generations of young people to the political matrix of Zimbabwe. It however
remains the duty of every Zimbabwean to guard the liberation war legacy jealously and never again allow a clique or
political movement for selfish reasons, to monopolize it in legitimizing oppression,
theft and plunder.
The writer writes here in his personal capacity and can be contacted at
tchimhavi@gmail.com
